

Reverse TOM Effect in May on United States capital market

Authors: Razvan Stefanescu, Ramona Dumitriu

Abstract: Some circumstances could favor the increase of stock returns at the turn-of-the month. However, in the case of May, the influence of these circumstances could interfere with the selling stocks impact in the Halloween strategies framework. This paper approaches the behavior of returns from United States capital market in a time interval that starts in the last trading day of April, and it ends in the fourth trading day of May. For the period January 2010 – June 2025 we found abnormal low returns in this time interval.

Keywords: Turn-of-the month effect; Halloween strategies; United States capital market

JEL: G40, G10, G14

1. INTRODUCTION

The turn-of-the month (TOM) effect refers to abnormal high stock returns in a time interval that includes the first trading days of a month and the last trading days of the previous month (e.g. Ariel, 1987; Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988). In the financial markets literature there were revealed several circumstances that could favor this calendar anomaly: the investors' reactions to the news about macroeconomic indicators, to companies' results or to public announcements of the corporate strategic investment decisions, the standardizations of some payments, the practice of window dressing, the transactions performed to diminish the tax liabilities etc. (e.g. Brown et al., 1983; Jansson, 1983; Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986; Ogden, 1987; Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988; Ogden, 1990; Woolridge & Snow, 1990; Lakonishok et al., 1991; Donders et al., 2000; Dumontier & Raffournier, 2002; Jones et al., 2004; Nikkinen et al., 2007).

The persistence in time of TOM Effect is a controversial subject in the financial literature. The presence of this form of seasonality on United States capital market was confirmed by numerous investigations (e.g. Agrawal and Tandon, 1994; Pettengill and Jordan, 1988; Ogden, 1990; Ziemba and Hensel, 1994; Hensel et al., 2000; Kunkel et al., 2003; Dzhabarov and Ziemba, 2010; Sharma and Narayan, 2014). There are, however, studies that concluded that TOM Effect disappeared after it had become public (Maberly and Waggoner, 2000; Han et al., 2025).

A previous investigation found some particularities of TOM effect for different durations of the year (e.g. Stefanescu and Dumitriu, 2024). In this paper we study the behavior of returns from United States capital market, in a time interval that starts in the last trading day of April and it ends in the fourth trading day of May. In this time interval, the

influence of circumstances specific to the TOM effect could collide with the impact of selling stocks in the framework of Halloween strategies.

The well-known Halloween strategies are based on the old saying „Sell in May and go away”, which refers to the belief among many investors that May could be the start of a bear market. To avoid the losses, they sell stocks, and their transactions could lead to a decline of stocks returns. The bear market is supposed to last until autumn when the investors are expected to buy stocks. Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) documented the Halloween Effect, a calendar anomaly describing the pattern of stock returns to be significantly lower in the May - October time interval than in the rest of the year. Many studies concluded that form of seasonality was persistent in time (e.g. Jacobsen and Visaltanachoti, 2009; Haggard and Witte, 2010; Andrade et al., 2013; Lloyd et al., 2017; Arendas et al., 2018; Magnusson, 2021; Zhang and Jacobsen, 2021). However, other investigations found that Halloween Effect weakened or even disappeared after it had been published (e.g. Dichtl and Drobetz, 2015; Degenhardt and Auer, 2018).

A Halloween strategy contains two main phases. In the first one, the investors buy stocks in November or in the following months. The second phase consists in selling the stocks in April or May (e.g. Bouman and Jacobsen, 2002; Swinkels & Van Vliet, 2012). The beginning of such transactions could cause abnormal returns of stocks. A previous study found that, in the first days of purchase transactions associated to the Halloween strategies, the returns from United States capital market were consistently high (e.g. Stefanescu and Dumitriu, 2025). In this paper we investigate whether, especially in the first days, the selling transactions, made to apply such strategies, have a significant influence on the returns.

This investigation covers the period January 2010 - June 2025 and it uses four major indexes from United States capital market. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second part provides a description of data and methodology employed to investigate the presence of abnormal returns on the last trading day of April and on the first four trading days of May, the third part presents empirical results, and the fourth part concludes.

2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. Data Description

To study the impact of selling transactions associated with the Halloween strategies on US capital market, we employ the daily closing values of four major indexes: Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500), Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), NASDAQ Composite (NASDAQ) and Russell 2000. The source of data is Yahoo! Finance. We compute the log returns of these indexes using the formula:

$$r_{j,t} = [\ln(P_{j,t}) - \ln(P_{j,t-1})] \times 100 \quad (1)$$

in which $P_{j,t}$ and $P_{j,t-1}$ are the closing prices of the index j from the days t and $t-1$, respectively.

Tab. 1 reports the descriptive statistics of returns. NASDAQ has the highest average and Russell 2000 the lowest. The values of standard deviation and the interquartile range suggest the return of Russell 2000 has the highest volatility. The Jarque-Bera tests didn't confirm, for none of the four indexes, the hypothesis of returns normal distribution.

Tab. 1. Descriptive statistics of the returns

Index	S&P 500	DJIA	NASDAQ	Russell 2000
Mean	0.0441	0.0370	0.0563	0.0320
Median	0.0695	0.0630	0.1068	0.0855
Minimum	-12.7652	-13.8418	-13.1492	-15.3991
Maximum	9.0895	10.7643	11.4784	8.9763
Std. Dev.	1.1054	1.0594	1.3048	1.4451
IQ range	0.9552	0.9166	1.2194	1.4908
Jarque-Bera test	29366.0***	60231.1***	11124.2***	13029.8***

Note: *** means significant at 0.01 level.

The Augmented Dickey – Fuller unit root tests were employed to study the stationarity of returns (e.g. Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The results indicate that returns of the four indexes are stationary (Tab. 2).

Tab. 2. Results of ADF tests

Index	Test without constant		Test with constant	
	Number of lags	Test statistic	Number of lags	Test statistic
S&P 500	11	-17.6059***	11	-17.8323***
DJIA	10	-18.6256***	10	-18.7875***
NASDAQ	9	-19.7014***	9	-19.9481***
Russell 2000	9	-19.5061***	9	-19.5116***

Notes: The optimum number of lags was identified by Akaike (1974) Information Criterion; *** means significant at 0.01 level.

2.2. Methodology

In this investigation we use two time intervals:

- ToMay, which starts in the last trading day of April and it ends in the fourth trading day of May;
- R_ToMay, which comprises the trading days of a year that are not included in ToMay time interval.

To study the returns from the two time intervals, we use OLS models with a dummy variable (D_{ToMay}). This dummy variable has the formula:

$$D_{ToMay_t} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if the trading day } t \text{ belongs to the ToMay} \\ & \text{time interval} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The OLS models are defined by the equation:

$$r_{j,t} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 \times D_{ToMay_t} + \sum_{i=1}^n \xi_i \times r_{j,t-i} + \varepsilon_t \tag{2}$$

where:

- μ_0 is a coefficient that expresses the average returns from the R_ToMay time interval;
- μ_1 is a coefficient associated to the dummy variable D_{ToMay} , that reflects the difference between the average of returns that occur in the two time intervals: ToMay and R_ToMay;

- ξ_i is a coefficient associated to the i lagged value of the dependent variable;
- n is the number of the lagged value of $r_{j,t}$, chosen by Akaike (1974) Information Criterion;
- ε_t is the error term that is supposed to follow a normal distribution with the zero-mean and a constant variance.

We investigate the the homoscedasticity of the error term by employing Breusch - Pagan (1979) test.

Along with OLS models we also employ GARCH(1,1) models (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). These models contain two equations, the first one being similar with equation (2). The second equation is associated to the variance of the error term (h_t) which is allowed to be variable:

$$h_t = \lambda + \alpha_1 \times \varepsilon_{t-1}^2 + \beta_1 \times h_{t-1} \tag{3}$$


in which:

- λ is a constant term;
- α_1 is a coefficient associated to the lagged squared values of the error term;
- β_1 is a coefficient associated to the lagged variance.

3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The average returns for the two time intervals are presented in Fig. 1. For all four indexes we found negative values in ToMay and positive values in R_ToMay.

Fig. 1. Average returns in the two time intervals



Tab. 3 displays the results of OLS models. For all four indexes we obtained significant negative values of the μ_1 coefficients. The Breusch-Pagan tests indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity.

Tab. 3. Coefficients of OLS models

Index	S&P 500	DJIA	NASDAQ	Russell 2000
-------	---------	------	--------	--------------

μ_0	0.0552*** (0.0178)	0.0464*** (0.0170)	0.0682*** (0.0210)	0.0446* (0.0233)
μ_1	-0.2998** (0.1240)	-0.2547** (0.1189)	-0.3232** (0.1467)	-0.4780*** (0.1625)
ξ_1	-0.1145*** (0.0159)	-0.1129*** (0.0159)	-0.0942*** (0.0159)	-0.0873*** (0.0159)
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity	183.620***	117.265***	86.108***	42.055***

Notes: Standard errors are within parentheses; ***, ** and * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.

The GARCH(1,1) models provided, again, significant negative values of the μ_1 coefficients (Tab. 4).

Tab. 4. Coefficients of GARCH(1,1) models

Index	S&P 500	DJIA	NASDAQ	Russell 2000
μ_0	0.0880*** (0.0122)	0.0740*** (0.0116)	0.1024*** (0.0154)	0.0633*** (0.0178)
μ_1	-0.2141** (0.0835)	-0.1764** (0.0826)	-0.2478** (0.1137)	-0.3538*** (0.1250)
ξ_1	-0.0486*** (0.0178)	x	-0.0377** (0.0173)	x
λ	0.0366*** (0.0047)	0.0361*** (0.0048)	0.0446*** (0.0065)	0.0492*** (0.0095)
α_1	0.1648*** (0.0143)	0.1671*** (0.0147)	0.1298*** (0.0119)	0.1081*** (0.0116)
β_1	0.8055*** (0.0145)	0.7987*** (0.0154)	0.8435*** (0.0129)	0.8663*** (0.0142)

Notes: Standard errors are within parentheses; *** and ** mean significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The results of this investigation indicate, for all four indexes, abnormal low returns in the ToMay time interval. This Reverse TOM Effect in May could be explained by the impact of selling stocks in the framework of Halloween strategies. These transactions annihilated the influence of the circumstance that could generate the classical TOM Effect.

From the perspective of dispute between Efficient Markets Hypothesis and Behavioral Finance it is important the persistence in time of this form of seasonality. One of the main Efficient Markets Hypothesis' principles proclaimed that investors couldn't systematically outperform the financial markets by using knowledge about the characteristics of returns' past evolutions (e.g. Alexander, 1961; Levy, 1967; Fama, 1970). From the Behavioral Finance's perspective, any form of seasonality that could be exploited in successful investment strategies could be used as an argument against the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (e.g. Thaler, 1987; Dimson and Mussavian, 1998; Schwert, 2002; Patel and Sewell, 2015; Keloharju et al., 2016). However, the exploitation of a form of seasonality not persistent in time could be very complex (e.g. Dimson and Marsh, 1999; Marquering et al., 2006).

Many forms of seasonality experienced changes when capital markets passed from turbulent to quieter times. The period of this investigation was complex, with many extraordinary events and processes (recovery from the global financial crisis and from the Great Recession, annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, COVID-19 pandemic, changes in Federal Reserve's monetary policy, Russian invasion of Ukraine, global energy crisis, Gaza-War, Iran-Israel war, threats of the trade wars, etc.). Such evolutions had a significant impact on the United States capital market (e.g. Baker et al., 2020; Egger and Zhu, 2020; Wei and Han, 2021; Bounou and Yatié, 2022; Cortes et al., 2022; D'Amico and King, 2023; Chowdhury and Khan, 2024; Oh and Kim, 2024; Pandey, 2025). It is hard to anticipate if the abnormal low returns from the ToMay time interval would persist in quieter times.

This investigation about TOM effect in May could be extended to other financial markets.

References

1. Agrawal, A. and Tandon, K., 1994. Anomalies or illusions? Evidence from stock markets in eighteen countries. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 13(1), pp. 83-106.
2. Akaike, H., 1974. A new look at the statistical model identification. *IEEE transactions on automatic control*, 19(6), pp. 716-723.
3. Alexander, S. S., 1961. Price movements in speculative markets: Trends or random walks. *Industrial Management Review (pre-1986)*, 2(2), pp. 7-26.
4. Andrade, S. C., Chhaochharia, V. and Fuerst, M. E., 2013. "Sell in May and Go Away" Just Won't Go Away. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 69(4), pp. 94-105.
5. Arendas, P., Malacka, V. and Schwarzova, M., 2018. A closer look at the Halloween Effect: The case of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. *International Journal of Financial Studies*, 6(2), pp. 1-12.
6. Ariel, R. A., 1987. A monthly effect in stock returns. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 18(1), pp. 161-174.
7. Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., Kost, K. J., Sammon, M. C. And Viratyosin, T., 2020. The unprecedented stock market impact of COVID-19 . NBER Working Paper No. 26945, [online] Available at: <https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26945/w26945.pdf [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
8. Bollerslev T., 1986. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. *Journal of Econometrics*, 31(3), pp. 307-27.

9. Bouman, S. and Jacobsen, B., 2002. The Halloween indicator, “sell in May and go away”: Another puzzle. *American Economic Review*, 92(5), pp. 1618-1635.
10. Bounou, W. and Yatié, A. (2022). The impact of the Ukraine–Russia war on world stock market returns. *Economics Letters*, 215, [online] Available at: <<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176522001355> [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
11. Breusch, T. S. and Pagan, A. R., 1979. A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation. *Econometrica*, 47(5), pp. 1287-1294.
12. Brown, P., Keim, D. B., Kleidon, A. W. and Marsh, T. A., 1983. Stock return seasonalities and the tax-loss selling hypothesis: Analysis of the arguments and Australian evidence. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 12(1), pp. 105-127.
13. Chowdhury, E. K. and Khan, I. I., 2024. Reactions of global stock markets to the Russia-Ukraine war: An empirical evidence. *Asia-Pacific Financial Markets*, 31(3), pp. 755-778.
14. Cortes, G. S., Gao, G. P., Silva, F. B. and Song, Z., 2022. Unconventional monetary policy and disaster risk: Evidence from the subprime and COVID–19 crises. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 122, [online] Available at: <<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261560621001947> [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
15. D’Amico, S. and King, T., 2023. Past and future effects of the recent monetary policy tightening. *Chicago Fed Letter*, No. 483, [online] Available at: <<https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2023/483> [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
16. Degenhardt, T. and Auer, B. R., 2018. The “Sell in May” effect: A review and new empirical evidence. *The North American Journal of Economics and Finance*, 43, pp. 169-205.
17. Dichtl, H. and Drobetz, W., 2015. Sell in May and go away: still good advice for investors?. *International Review of Financial Analysis*, 38, pp. 29-43.
18. Dickey, D.A. and Fuller, W.A., 1979. Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a unit root. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 74(366a), pp. 427-431.
19. Dickey, D.A. and Fuller, W.A., 1981. Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive time series with a unit root. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, pp. 1057-1072.

20. Dimson, E. and Marsh, P., 1999. Murphy's law and market anomalies. *The Journal of Portfolio Management*, 25(2), pp. 53-69.
21. Dimson, E. and Mussavian, M., 1998. A brief history of market efficiency. *European Financial Management*, 4(1), pp. 91-103.
22. Donders, M. W., Kouwenberg, R. and Vorst, T. C., 2000. Options and earnings announcements: an empirical study of volatility, trading volume, open interest and liquidity. *European Financial Management*, 6(2), pp. 149-171.
23. Dumontier, P. and Raffournier, B., 2002. Accounting and capital markets: a survey of the European evidence. *European Accounting Review*, 11(1), pp. 119-151.
24. Dzhabarov, C. and Ziemba, W. T., 2010. Do seasonal anomalies still work?. *Journal of Portfolio Management*, 36(3), pp.93-104.
25. Egger, P. H. and Zhu, J., 2020. The US–Chinese trade war: An event study of stock-market responses. *Economic Policy*, 35(103), pp. 519-559.
26. Engle, R.F., 1982. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the variance of United Kingdom inflation. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, pp. 987-1007.
27. Fama, E., 1970. Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work. *Journal of Finance*, 25, pp. 383-417.
28. Haggard, K. S. and Witte, H. D., 2010. The Halloween effect: trick or treat?. *International Review of Financial Analysis*, 19(5), pp. 379-387.
29. Han, L., Han, Y. and Tian, S., 2025. The disappearing turn-of-month effect. *Finance Research Letters*, 71, [online] Available at: <<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1544612324014909> [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
30. Hensel, C. R., Sick, G. A. and Ziemba, W. T., 2000. A Long Term Examination of the Turn-of-the-Month Effect in the S&P 500. In Keim, D. B., & Ziemba, W. T. (Eds.) *Security market imperfections in worldwide equity markets*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 218-246.
31. Jacobsen, B. and Visaltanachoti, N., 2009. The Halloween effect in US sectors. *Financial Review*, 44(3), pp. 437-459.

32. Jansson, S., 1983. The fine art of window dressing. *Institutional Investor*, 17(12), pp. 139-140.
33. Jones, E., Danbolt, J. and Hirst, I., 2004. Company Investment Announcements and the Market Value of the Firm, *European Journal of Finance*, 10(5), pp. 437-452.
34. Keloharju, M., Linnainmaa, J. T. and Nyberg, P., 2016. Return seasonalities. *The Journal of Finance*, 71(4), pp. 1557-1590.
35. Kunkel, R. A., Compton, W. S. and Beyer, S., 2003. The turn-of-the-month effect still lives: the international evidence. *International Review of Financial Analysis*, 12(2), pp. 207-221.
36. Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Thaler, R. H. and Vishny, R. W., 1991. Window dressing by pension fund managers. NBER Working Paper No. 3617, [online] Available at: <<https://www.nber.org/papers/w3617> [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
37. Lakonishok, J. and Smidt, S., 1986. Volume for winners and losers: Taxation and other motives for stock trading. *The Journal of Finance*, 41(4), pp. 951-974.
38. Lakonishok, J. and Smidt, S., 1988. Are seasonal anomalies real? A ninety-year perspective. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 1(4), pp. 403-425.
39. Levy, R. A., 1967. Random walks: Reality or myth. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 23(6), pp. 69-77.
40. Lloyd, R., Zhang, C. and Rydin, S., 2017. The Halloween Indicator is More a Treat than a Trick. *Journal of Accounting & Finance* (2158-3625), 17(6), [online] Available at: <<https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/gfsb/124/> [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
41. Maberly, E. D. and Waggoner, D. F., 2000. Closing the question on the continuation of turn-of-the-month effects: evidence from the S&P 500 Index futures contract. FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-11, [online] Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=244085 [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
42. Magnusson, G., 2021. Trick or treat? The Halloween effect in stock markets revisited. *Managerial Finance*, 47(2), pp. 209-226.
43. Marquering, W., Nisser, J. and Valla, T., 2006. Disappearing anomalies: a dynamic analysis of the persistence of anomalies. *Applied Financial Economics*, 16(4), pp. 291-302.

44. Ogden, J. P., 1987. The end of the month as a preferred habitat: A test of operational efficiency in the money market. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 22(3), pp. 329-343.

45. Ogden, J. P., 1990. Turn-of-month evaluations of liquid profits and stock returns: A common explanation for the monthly and January effects. *The Journal of Finance*, 45(4), pp. 1259-1272.

46. Oh, M. and Kim, D., 2024. Effect of the US–China trade war on stock markets: A financial contagion perspective. *Journal of Financial Econometrics*, 22(4), pp. 954-1005.

47. Pandey, D. K., 2025. Effects of Israel-Iran conflict: insights on global stock indices and currencies. *Journal of Economic Studies*, 52(4), pp. 762-783.

48. Patel, N. and Sewell, M., 2015. Calendar anomalies: a survey of the literature. *International Journal of Behavioural Accounting and Finance*, 5(2), pp. 99-121.

49. Pettengill, G. N. and Jordan, B. D., 1988. A comprehensive examination of volume effects and seasonality in daily security returns. *Journal of Financial Research*, 11(1), pp. 57-70.

50. Schwert, G. W., 2002. Anomalies and Market Efficiency. NBER Working Paper No. 9277, [online] Available at: <https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w9277/w9277.pdf [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].

51. Sharma, S. S. and Narayan, P. K., 2014. New evidence on turn-of-the-month effects. *Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money*, 29, pp. 92-108.

52. Stefanescu, R. and Dumitriu, R., 2024. TOM Effect from US capital market during the meteorological seasons, [online] Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5037885 [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].

53. Stefanescu, R. and Dumitriu, R., 2025. The returns of US capital market in the first days of purchase transactions associated to the Halloween strategies, [online] Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5115407 [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].

54. Swinkels, L. and Van Vliet, P., 2012. An anatomy of calendar effects. *Journal of Asset Management*, 13(4), pp. 271-286.

55. Thaler, R., 1987. Anomalies: seasonal movements in security prices II: weekend, holiday, turn of the month, and intraday effects. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1(2), pp. 169-177.
56. Wei, X. and Han, L., 2021. The impact of COVID-19 pandemic on transmission of monetary policy to financial markets. *International Review of Financial Analysis*, 74, [online] Available at: <<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S105752192100048X> [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
57. Woolridge, J. R. and Snow, C. C., 1990. Stock market reaction to strategic investment decisions. *Strategic Management Journal*, 11(5), pp. 353-363.
58. Zhang, C. Y. and Jacobsen, B., 2021. The Halloween indicator, “Sell in May and Go Away”: Everywhere and all the time. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 110(C), [online] Available at: <<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261560620302242> [Accessed June, 25th, 2025].
59. Ziemba, W. T. and Hensel, C. R., 1994. Worldwide security market anomalies. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A: Physical and Engineering Sciences*, 347(1684), pp. 495-509.