CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ‘PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL’ CONFLICTS
Most of the analyses for corporate governance have a company with dispersed ownership as a research object. The relevant to this type of a company classical conflict ‘principal-agent’ is decide by traditional mechanisms of the corporate governance and mainly by internal mechanisms.
A significant number of companies from developing countries have concentrated ownership. Their typical conflicts are between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders (principal-principal), which are reduced by external and internal mechanisms.For the countries of East Europe, incl. Bulgaria, the adaptation of the market principles is related to entering of foreign capitals and change of the shareholder structure. A necessity of researches for corporate governance of companies with concentrated ownership arises. The traditional issue for the corporate governance about protection of rights of minority shareholders has a new dimension – decreasing for the deviation between right of ownership and right of control.
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